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This paper provides a theoretical and quantitative explanation for the time-consuming integra-
tion process of young workers. The search process fails both in matching costlessly ¯rms and workers
and in screening matches of poor quality, thus leading to recurring job loss and high unemployment
at the entry of the labor market.
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11 Introduction
It is well known that young people face di±culties trying to integrate into the labor market and have
to experience several short-lived jobs before settling into more stable employment, ((Gangl M. and
MÄ uller W. 2003), (Ryan P. 2001), (Quintini G., Martin J.P. and Martin S. 2007), (OECD 1996a)).
OECD data reveal that the probability of being with the same employer ¯ve years later is higher
for prime-aged workers than for youth, ((OECD 1994)). Younger workers display both higher unem-
ployment rates and higher turnover whatever the country considered. The point is that high youth
unemployment rates are mainly due to a high frequency of entry to unemployment rather than lower
employment prospects.
This paper attempts to provide a theoretical and quantitative explanation for the labor market
integration dynamics of young workers. Surprisingly enough, few theoretical papers explicitly inves-
tigate this issue. (Neal D. 1999) developed a job search model to investigate the complexity of job
mobility among youth. He argued that changing ¯rst both careers and employers is an optimal job
search strategy. This should result in higher turnover at the labor market entry. In a recent paper,
(Kitao S., Ljungqvist L. and Sargent T. 2008) proposed a complete life-cycle model in which young
workers pass through a phase of job churning before being able to accumulate capital. Higher youth
unemployment rates in Europe are explained by the rise in minimum wages.
There are two main intuitions behind the school-to-work transition process. The standard approach
would be to consider human capital accumulation. As younger workers need to accumulate experience,
discrepancies between age-groups in unemployment and separation rates are partly due to di®erences
in productivities. Another approach considers that the information on the labor market is incomplete
thus leading to "job shopping". As de¯ned by (Johnson W.R. 1978), "job shopping refers to the period
of experimentation with jobs and accompanying high rates of mobility which typically occurs at the
beginning of the working life". The idea is the following: some characteristics of a match between a
worker and a ¯rm can be ascertained during job search while some others cannot be known without
experience in the job. Workers and employers have to engage in production to evaluate the long-term
potential of their match. In consequence, new entrants try out jobs to ¯nd a suitable match. This ap-
proach was mainly advanced by the empirical literature to explain school-to-work transitions while the
theoretical one attempted to account for evidence on worker turnover without any consideration for
life-cycle issues. (Pries M. and Rogerson R. 2005) developed a worker turnover model that integrates
a signal extraction problem in spirit of (Jovanovic B. 1979): the quality of a match is not perfectly
observed at the time of meeting but will be revealed stochastically by engaging in production. The
main contribution of the paper is to account for worker turnover di®erences observed between the
United states and European countries. They did not investigated discrepancies between age-groups.
This paper proposes to investigate the relevance of the theory of job shopping for explaining the
labor market integration process of young workers. The framework I rely on borrows from the learn-
ing model developed by (Pries M. and Rogerson R. 2005). I consider an economy in which workers
2tend to change job frequently while searching for a good match. Stochastic age-groups are introduced
but age speci¯city is not considered. I explore the employment composition e®ects when the search
process fails in both matching costlessly ¯rms and workers, and screening matches of poor quality.
The learning process on match quality is source of recurring job loss at the labor market entry. The
speci¯city of young workers comes from their entry position on the labor market. As new workers
need time to ¯nd both a job and a good match, separations and unemployment are decreasing with
age.
Finally, to test the robustness of the model, I rely on simulations and compute it above French data.
The model performs well in reproducing discrepancies observed between 20-24 and 25-54 years old
individuals in the separation and unemployment rates.
The next section presents the model that is close to the "laissez-faire" economy of (Pries M. and
Rogerson R. 2005). The paper does not account for labor market institutions and I simplify the basic
framework proposed by the authors by assuming homogeneity in potential match quality. Finally, the
analytical and quantitative results are derived in section 3.
2 The Model
2.1 The environment
The basic environment borrows from the traditional matching model µ a la Pissarides. Workers and
¯rms are forward-looking, risk-neutral and have a common exogenous discount rate of ¯. Time is
discrete and the model is developed in a general equilibrium setting.
The labor force is constant over time. At each period, a fraction ± enters the labor market as
young and have a probability (1 ¡ ¸) of becoming adult next period. All workers have a probability
± to exit from the labor market2. Thus, in the absence of any age-targeted policies, heterogeneity in
age does not a®ect the equilibrium value of µ. The paper focuses on employment composition e®ects
while decisions are not age-dependant. To account for the labor market °ows from school to work, a
fraction ±u < 1 of new entrants is assumed to start their working-life as unemployed while a fraction
(1 ¡ ±u) > 0 enter the labor market directly as employed in their ¯rst job. Actually, this assumption
is only relevant for the simulations as it allows me to investigate how labor market frictions a®ect the
unemployment gap between youth and adult workers.
The labor market is a®ected by search frictions. Workers and ¯rms are brought together according
to a standard matching function, m(u;v) = u'v(1¡') where u and v denote respectively the unem-
ployment and the vacancy rates of the economy. The probability to ¯ll a vacancy and the probability
2Assuming that only adult workers exit from the labor market as they retire would permit to replicate the main
features of (Ch¶ eron A., Hairault J-O. and Langot F. 2008b) without modifying the results drawn by the analysis.
However, the paper focuses on the labor market entry process
3of an unemployed ¯nding a job are expressed by respectively q(µ) =
m(u;v)




u the labor market tightness. From the standard properties of the matching function, we have
q0(µ) < 0 and p0(µ) > 0. It should be notice that unemployed workers are homogenous so that I do
not integrate segmented search between new entrants and experienced workers.
A worker and a ¯rm who are matched together produce an output y which level depends on how
the worker's attributes mesh the ¯rm's attributes. A match can be either high productive, yh, or low
productive, yl. Firms and workers do not perfectly observe the quality of a match, but the proportion
of good matches in the economy, Ã, is common knowledge. It represents the probability for a match
to be of good quality. I thus di®er from (Pries M. and Rogerson R. 2005) by assuming homogeneity
in potential match quality. Indeed, the authors assumed that the value of Ã is drawn from a general
distribution at the time of meeting. In consequence, ¯rms and workers evaluate the potential of their
match before engaging in production and not all matches turn out to be potentially good enough to
be formed. This assumption is required to analyze how labor market institutions or policies a®ect
hiring practices. The paper focuses on employment compositions e®ects in an economy where the
search process fails to weed out all matches of poor quality. As I do not investigate hiring practices,
I assume that the signal on match quality is common to all matches.
Next, the match quality is revealed stochastically only by engaging in production, in the manner
of (Pries M. and Rogerson R. 2005). Firms and workers attempt to infer the quality from the observed
output °ow, ~ yt = y + ¹t, which is the sum of two unobserved components, the true match quality,
y = fyl;yhg, and a noisy component, ¹t. This last term represents transitory factors that a®ect the
production process. It thus prevents ¯rms and workers from perfectly inferring the information after
¯rst producing: the learning process on match quality is then time-consuming. Besides, ¹ is assumed
to be a mean zero iid random variable, uniformly distributed on [¡¹ ¹; ¹ ¹], so the learning process takes
a "all-or-nothing" form, (Figure 1):
• If ~ yt < yh ¡ ¹ ¹, the match is revealed to be bad. If ~ yt > yl + ¹ ¹, the match is revealed to be good.
• If ~ yt 2 [yh ¡ ¹ ¹;yl + ¹ ¹], ¯rms and workers cannot determine whether the observation re°ects
more the match quality rather than a bad or good fortune. They will infer the information next
period according to the new realization of ¹ and regardless of the previous observations.
Let ® =
yh¡yl
2¹ ¹ denote the exogenous probability that the match type is revealed.
4Figure 1: The learning process
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The match is revealed to be good, output yl
The match is revealed to be bad, yh
t y ~
All jobs have a common probability s to be exogenously destructed in each period and we are
interested in equilibria in which matches revealed to be bad are dissolved.
Finally, the assumptions about timing are the following: job search occurring in t entails production
in t+1. At the end of the period, ¯rms and workers observe the output °ow ~ yt+1 and the quality will
be revealed accordingly. Some matches turn out to be dissolved ; whatever the cause of the separation,
¯rms and workers are allowed to search for a new suitable match next period3.
2.2 Age Employment dynamics
The outsider labor force is de¯ned by workers who are searching for a good match, both unemployed
(U) and employed (No), and the insider labor force by workers who are employed in a match revealed
to be good, (Nh). The representation of the labor market is given by ¯gure 2.
3Contrary to (Pries M. and Rogerson R. 2005), I do not assume that a job ceases to exist when hit by a shock. This
assumption is required by the authors to distinguish between job and worker turnover.
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The labor force is constant over time and normalized to one: ut + no
t + nh
t = 1. The youth and
adult population are denoted by the superior k = y;a. The employment and unemployment dynamics
are given by the following set of equations:
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A fraction ±u of new entrants and young workers who are separated from their job falls into the youth
unemployment pool. The mass of young unemployed workers at period t + 1 is thus composed by
young workers who start searching for a job in t + 1 and by young unemployed workers who did not
¯nd a job in period t. Then, the mass of adult unemployed workers at period t + 1 is composed by
adults and young workers entering the adult age-group who remain or become unemployed. Recall
that all workers exit the labor market with rate ±.
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6Unemployed workers who ¯nd a job in period t enter the employment pool at period t + 1. Similarly,
a fraction of new entrants are assumed to have searched for a job during education and enter the
labor market directly as employed. They have to experience the match to reveal the quality of the
employment relationship. Once the quality is known to be good, workers enter the insider segment of
the labor market where destructions are only driven by economic shocks.
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2.3 The Labor market Equilibrium
There is continuum of identical ¯rms. One ¯rm is assumed to have one job which can be either vacant
and costing c by unit of time, or occupied. Workers are either employed specialized in production or
unemployed specialized in job search and enjoying some real return z. As the match quality is not
perfectly observed, job creation decisions and wage bargaining are based on the signal Ã.
Let ¦v be the value of an un¯lled employment position to a ¯rm and V u be the value of unemployment
to a worker. These two values must satisfy:
¦v = ¡c + ¯
©
q(µ)¦o + [1 ¡ q(µ)]¦vª
(7)
V u = z + ¯(1 ¡ ±)
©
p(µ)Vo + [1 ¡ p(µ)]V uª
(8)
¦o and Vo denote the expected gain of matches of unknown quality for respectively ¯rms and workers,
and are given by:
¦o =Ãyh + (1 ¡ Ã)yl ¡ wo + ¯(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ s)
©
(1 ¡ ®)¦o + ®Ã¦h + ®(1 ¡ Ã)¦vª
+ ¯[s + ±(1 ¡ s)]¦v (9)
Vo = wo + ¯(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ s)
©
(1 ¡ ®)Vo + ®ÃVh + ®(1 ¡ Ã)V uª
+ ¯(1 ¡ ±)sV u (10)
The expected output °ow is E(~ yt) = Ãyh +(1¡Ã)yl. If the position is revealed to be of good quality,
the information is updated: ¯rms and workers get respectively ¦h and Vh that solve:
¦h = yh ¡ wh + ¯
½
[s + (1 ¡ s)±]¦v + (1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ ±)¦h
¾
(11)
Vh = wh + ¯(1 ¡ ±)
©
sV u + (1 ¡ s)Vh
ª
(12)
As is standard, wages are determined according to the Nash bargaining solution in which the




Vi ¡ V u¤1¡°£
¦i ¡ ¦v¤° for i = fo;hg (13)
7with °, the worker's relative bargaining power coe±cient. The sharing rule is given by:
(Vi ¡ V u) = °
£
Vi ¡ V u + ¦i ¡ ¦v¤
(14)
In equilibrium, all pro¯t opportunities are exploited so that the rent from vacant jobs is drove to zero:




The labor market tightness is such that the expected pro¯t from a new job equals the expected cost
of hiring a worker.
De¯nition 1 The steady-state equilibrium values of µ, wo and wh satisfy the free entry condition 15
and the sharing rule 14:
8
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wi = °(yi + cµ) + (1 ¡ °)b for i = fo;hg
3 The speci¯city of youth labor markets
The framework points out that labor market frictions and imperfect information generate discrepancies
between age-groups. As young workers need time to ¯nd both a job and a good match, they exhibit
higher separation and unemployment rates.
3.1 Analytical results
Adults' characteristic is that they have a greater experience on the labor market. Once established
in a good match, workers face lower unemployment risks. In the developed framework, the learning
process is source of recurring job loss.
Proposition 1 The destruction rate of outsider employment is higher than the destruction rate of
insider employment:
s + (1 ¡ s)®(1 ¡ Ã) > s
Young workers enter the labor market as outsiders, either unemployed or employed. Stochastic reve-
lation of the match quality renders the learning process time-consuming.
Result 1 The proportion of outsiders should be relatively higher among young workers than among
adults. The learning process on match quality thus leads to higher separation and unemployment rates.
8Besides, given that lower quali¯cations would result in higher mismatch, the lower Ã, the larger
destructions on the youth labor market relative the the adult one. Thus, discrepancies between age-
groups should be higher in a low-skilled labor market. This is consistent with the empirical evidence.
The shape of the unemployment rate is determined not only by the learning process but also by
labor market frictions.
Proposition 2 Frictions on the labor market render the hiring process time-consuming, the unem-
ployment rate is thus higher at the labor market entry.
Let us assume that young start their working life as unemployed, (±u = 1). The unemployment rate
thus decreases with age even with complete information. Then, a more e±cient matching process (a
higher p(µ)) would result in lower youth unemployment rates. This is consistent with OECD data. The
US labor market is well known for the e±ciency of the matching process contrary to Europe. European
countries as a whole exhibit a youth unemployment rate 1.5 times higher than in the US. Similarly,
the lower the value of ±u, the lower the unemployment rate at the labor market entry. This suggests
that education systems by apprenticeship which result in smoother school-to-work transitions are
source of lower discrepancies in unemployment between young and middle-aged workers, as observed
in Germany and Denmark (contrary to France or Belgium). Moreover, dual systems should also
prevent from mismatch thereby reducing unemployment risks at the labor market entry.
3.2 Quantitative results
I now turn to a quantitative evaluation of the impact of both the matching and the learning processes
on the youth labor market. In order to take into account typical age-speci¯c unemployment rates,
I consider a youth population composed by 20-24 years old individuals starting working, and adult
workers who are between 25 and 54 years old. Simulations allow me to investigate the robustness of
the framework. The model is computed above French data in order to reproduce labor market °ows
observed in 2002 for the whole population. I investigate its strength to reproduce discrepancies by
age-groups.
3.2.1 Calibration
The month is taken as unit of time. As we are interested in equilibrium in which matches revealed
to be bad are dissolved4, we set yl = b. The calibration of parameters ®, s and ±u is based on data
from the French Labor Force Survey 2002. Employment of tenure higher than 5 years should be
composed by matches revealed to be good while employment of tenure lower than 1 year should be
composed by matches of unknown quality. I consider the empirical transition rates from employment
to unemployment between 2001 and 2002 as proxies for the separation rates of outsider and insider
employment. The exogenous destruction rate of the economy is ¯xed accordingly. The probability
4yl = b is a su±cient condition to ensure that ¦l = (1 ¡ °)(yl ¡ b) + °cµ + ¯(1 ¡ s)¦l < 0
9® is computed to match the di®erence between separation rates of outsider and insider employment.
Theoretically, this di®erence is given by: f0¡fh = [s+(1¡s)®(1¡Ã)]¡s () ® =
f0¡fh
(1¡s)(1¡Ã). Then,
we choose a value of Ã that reproduces an overall separation rate of 0.82%. Next, the fraction of new
workers starting their working life as unemployed, ±u, is set according to the monthly transition rate
from school to unemployment observed in 2002. Finally, the targeted hiring rate is 8.52%. The level
of the unemployment income, b, is computed to ensure that the desired tightness is an equilibrium





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The ¯rst column of Table 2 summarizes the main labor market statistics observed in France in 2002.
Simulation results5 are reported in the second column.
Table 2: Results for the [20-24] and [25-54] years old
French Economy 2002 Simulation Simulation for ±u = 0
Unemployment rate, (%): 7.6 9.03 8.68
[20-24] 17:58 21:58 17:28
[25-54] 6:72 8:20 8:11
Youth relative to Adult 2.6 2.59 2.13
Firing rate, (%): 0.82 0.82 0.82
[20-24] 2:89 2:16 2:16
[25-54] 0:66 0:75 0:75
Youth relative to Adult 4.3 2.88 2.88
Hiring rate, (%): 8.52 8.52 8.52
[20-24] 12:36 8:52 8:52
[25-54] 7:65 8:52 8:52
Youth relative to Adult 1.6 1 1
The model performs well in reproducing discrepancies between age-groups in unemployment and
separation rates. The learning process explains almost 70% of the observed discrepancies in ¯rings
between young and adult workers while the simulated unemployment ratio between youth and adults
almost equals the observed one. Recall that the probability p(µ) is common to all workers, so this
framework is not able to reproduce the shape of the hiring rate. In consequence, the youth unem-
ployment rate is overestimated. Similarly, I do not consider the employment protection legislation.
Young workers are mainly hired in ¯xed-term contracts which improves worker turnover. We can
suppose that taking into account this fact will allow us to better match the worker turnover's pro¯le
and discrepancies in the unemployment rate.
Next, the analysis suggested that labor market frictions imply higher unemployment at the labor
market entry when workers start their working life as unemployed. The youth-adult unemployment
gap thus results from both the time-consuming matching and learning processes. In order to inves-
tigate the contribution of the learning process on the shape of the unemployment rate, the model
5Computing and simulating the model to match worker turnover observed in France in 1994 gave similar results.
They are available upon request.
12Table 3: Results for the [20-29] and [30-54] years old
French Economy 2002 Simulation Simulation for ±u = 0
Unemployment rate, (%): 7.6 9.02 8.68
[20-29] 13:06 19:47 17:01
[30-54] 6:16 7:64 7:58
Youth relative to Adult 2.12 2.55 2.24
Firing rate, (%): 0.82 0.82 0.82
[20-29] 1:95 1:94 1:94
[30-54] 0:55 0:69 0:69
Youth relative to Adult 3.57 2.81 2.81
Hiring rate, (%): 8.52 8.52 8.52
[20-29] 11:52 8:52 8:52
[30-54] 6:90 8:52 8:52
Youth relative to Adult 1.67 1 1
is simulated for a null value of ±u. Young people directly start their working life as employed but
have to experience several jobs in order to ¯nd a suitable match. In consequence, all discrepancies
in the unemployment rate results from the time-consuming learning process that generates recurring
job loss. The simulation results suggest that the learning process accounts for 83% of the simulated
discrepancies in unemployment between age-groups: the ratio between youth and adult unemployment
reaches 2.24 while the model with ±u > 0 reproduces a ratio of 2.55. The unemployment gap is mainly
due to the learning process on match quality.
Finally, one can question the age-groups' choice. To test the robustness of the model, simulations
are done considering the following age-groups: [20-29] and [30-54] years old individuals. Results are
similar to the previous ones (Table 3). The model is now able to match 78.7% of the di®erences in
unemployment risks between young and adult workers, and 87.8% of the unemployment gap between
young and adults comes from the time-consuming learning process. As the age-group of young workers
is larger, the observed discrepancies get reduced. However, the model is not sensitive enough. The
ratio in the separation rate decreases from 2:88 to 2:81 while the observed one goes from 4:3 to 3:57.
134 Conclusion
This paper proposes a basic framework to account for the speci¯city of youth labor markets observed
in most OECD countries. The central feature is that it integrates a signal extraction problem into a
matching framework. I do not claim that imperfect information on the labor market is the only source
of di®erences between young and adult workers. Human capital accumulation, labor market institu-
tions and educational systems should obviously impact on workers' labor market trajectories. The
purpose of the paper was to examine an approach to which the empirical literature already referred,
unlike the theoretical one. The main contribution is thus to show how learning on match quality and
labor market frictions interact to explain the integration process of young workers. The theory of job
shopping appears to be relevant for explaining the labor market integration dynamics of young workers.
The analysis suggests that the time-consuming learning process is source of recurring job loss
at the labor market entry. The model performs well in reproducing discrepancies in separation and
unemployment rates by age-group and highlights the major impact of incomplete information on the
youth labor market. However, this model is mainly relevant for continental European labor markets.
As stated previously, Germany, Netherland or Denmark with dual education systems exhibit smoother
labor market integration processes.
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